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 Abstract 
Leadership appointment during mergers has a logical and established precedent when 
there is a clear target and acquirer. However, in the extraordinary case of Merger Of Equals 
(MOEs) – where this is relatively equal ownership, board representation, earnings contribution 
etc - this process is much less defined and can often have serious consequences on the merger, 
both in closing negotiations as well as post-merger performance. Intuition assumes the better 
performing CEO should and will be appointed. In practice, however, that is often not the case. It 
is arguable that performance can be defined through objective means (financially & 
operationally), yet CEO appointment usually is resolved through political negotiations and 
financial concessions.  
Building upon previous studies of mergers and employing public information and 
reported financial data in multivariate statistical analyses, this study examines two research 
questions pertinent to MOE leadership appointment. First – is prior performance of merger CEOs 
a significant predictor for leadership selection in MOEs, and second - what metrics of past 
performance by merger CEOs, if any, are significantly correlated with short-term financial and 
operational success of the merged company? Determining whether or not a relationship exists 
between past performance and leadership selection, as well as post-merger success can have 
significant influence on the leadership appointment process for Mergers of Equals. 
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I.  Introduction 
 
For the past century, mergers and acquisitions (M&As) have played an important 
role in the corporate development of some of the world’s largest companies. Industry 
leaders across the Global Fortune 500 – AT&T, J.P. Morgan, General Electric - can 
attribute their spot on the list to a long history of M&As.  In 2007 alone, 46,701 M&A 
transactions were completed for an aggregate value of $4.3 trillion (Ernst & Young, 
2012). For perspective, that is approximately thirty percent of the United States Gross 
Domestic Product during that same year.  
As the amount and scale of mergers continues to increase, merger transactions are 
dramatically influencing not only the trajectory of specific companies, but entire 
industries. In addition, relevant literature on the topic has shown that most of these 
industry-shaping mergers end up in failure (Allred, 2005). Given the increasingly 
intertwined nature of the world economy, these outcomes often have reverberating 
consequences across the globe. While explanation of merger failure is often hard to 
distinguish among various internal and external factors, one aspect of the merger process 
that is undoubtedly critical is the actual implementation (Allred, 2005). Recent literature 
has shown that the method of leadership selection during mergers has a significant effect 
on the integration process. This involves appointments determining overall corporate 
governance, the top management team, and particularly the Chief Executive Officer 
(CEO) (Harding, 2004). 
Given the importance of the leadership appointment process, one would think 
decisions involving CEO appointment would follow a set of industry-accepted practices. 
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This is usually true. Typical mergers - where a clear target and acquirer are established 
through relative differences in size and operations - settle these particular pre-merger 
negotiations through a reliance on historical precedents and generally accepted corporate 
practice (Ocasio, 1999). Regarding management and corporate structure, the target 
manager often loses his position and the board is largely composed of acquirer appointees 
(Harris, 1994). Similar precedents are followed regarding company headquarters and 
name. This widely held-to model is undisputed in practicality; the company with 
distinctly more contribution to a firm’s assets, earnings, and market value has justifiable 
leverage in retaining their executive in a merger. Thus, in most cases it appears as though 
the corporate governance structure is easily determined. However, for a small portion of 
the merger market, the process is not so clear.  
In this report, I look at a particularly relevant form of merger case study as it 
pertains to leadership appointment, known as Merger of Equals (MOEs). MOEs have 
seen substantial growth in activity in volume and magnitude over the past fifteen years. 
Headline transactions of this form include: United and Continental Airlines, Sprint and 
Nextel, J.P. Morgan Chase and Bank One, and AOL and Time Warner. These particular 
mergers are generally defined by combinations between two firms that are equivalent in 
size and influence, leading to reasonably equal ownership and board representation. 
Along with those negotiations, intangible issues related to the location of company 
headquarters and the company’s name are also determined in pre-merger deliberations 
(Wulf, 2004). 
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Lacking historical precedent, natural intuition assumes the better performing 
leadership should and will be appointed; most employment decisions heavily weight 
one’s previous achievements in the selection process. However that may not be the case 
during intensely complex MOE negotiations. In addition, there is little literature 
involving leadership appointment specific to MOEs. Although significant research exists 
pertaining to incentive structures, CEO ability and performance, and the leadership 
appointment process with typical mergers, there is very little in regards to MOEs. The 
few examples found involved assessing the effects of specific forms of leadership 
succession on MOE performance, and the conflict between a CEO’s quest “for power 
over premium” (Wulf, 2004).  
As previously described, the leadership selection process is dramatically different, 
far more ambiguous, and much less researched when involving the relatively recent 
phenomena of MOEs. Literature and case studies relevant to CEO appointment in MOEs 
allude to a process resolved more through political negotiations and financial concessions 
than evaluation of merits (Wulf, 2004). Two recent large scale mergers help to highlight 
this issue.  
On July 2, 2012 at 4:30 pm Duke Energy approved the acquisition of Progress 
Energy, appointing Bill Johnson – CEO of Progress – as CEO of what is now the largest 
utility company in the United States. Less than two hours later the newly combined board 
voted to fire Bill Johnson as CEO and replace him with Jim Rodgers – Former CEO of 
Duke and assumed Chairman of the combined company. Prior to this announcement, 
Rodgers described the rationale behind Johnson’s appointment as CEO as purely based 
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on finances; “I effectively gave up the CEO job to pay a lower premium. I thought it was 
better for our shareholders” (Barrett, 2012). This insinuates the determinant in leadership 
appointment was political negotiation to enhance certain investors’ immediate returns, 
not objective evaluation of each candidate’s business merit or ability to achieve projected 
synergies from the combination. Shortly after re-taking the CEO position, Rodgers 
emphasized Johnson’s historical record of poor performance as the main criteria behind 
his removal (Barrett, 2012). These before and after rationales present two vastly different 
forms of leadership appointment: one based purely on politics, the other on performance. 
On September 10, 2012 commodities trading & mining company Glencore 
International revised its takeover bid of mining giant Xstrata in hopes of keeping their 
$30 billion merger agreement alive. Glencore’s board sweetened seemingly subjective 
aspects by increasing its premium paid to Xstrata. However, other conditions assumed to 
be objectively determined were completely reversed (Guthrie, 2012). In the original 
merger announcement, Glencore’s board had come to the deliberate conclusion that 
Xstrata’s CEO was best fit to lead the soon-to-be combined company. Now, in the newly 
revised offer, the Glencore board had a sudden change-of-mind in requiring that their 
own CEO would now lead the company. Was this a legitimate change of heart or another 
example of the merger leadership appointment succumbing to politics and financial 
concessions? 
Given the ambiguity of the leadership appointment process, and its effect on 
merger outcomes, more research into this subject matter is required. This study examines 
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two unaddressed research questions and presents hypotheses pertinent to MOE leadership 
appointment:  
- Is prior performance of merger CEOs a significant predictor for leadership 
selection in MOEs?  
(Hypothesis: Prior performance of merger CEOs is not a significant predictor 
for leadership selection in MOEs.) 
- What measures of prior performance by merger CEOs, if any, are significantly 
correlated with short-term financial and operational success of the merged 
company?  
(Hypothesis: Better prior performance by merger CEOs will be significantly 
correlated with short-term success of the merged company.) 
First, it is important to empirically establish whether or not objective measures of 
past performance are or are not heavily weighted in the leadership selection process for 
MOEs. I find that past performance is not a significant consideration in this process. 
Once that has been determined, I investigate whether or not merged companies with 
better performing CEOs appointed do materially better than those with worse performers 
in the C-suite. I show that there is largely not a significant difference in performance, 
although some outcomes do show this to be the case. Other characteristics of leadership 
appointment and corporate governance are also investigated, including Chairman 
appointments and headquarters locations. These examinations yield similar results. The 
results can be partially explained by the dynamics particular to the study. Nonetheless, 
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these findings yield a variety of important implications for leadership selection across all 
forms of mergers.  
The paper is organized as follows. Section II presents further analysis of topics 
involving mergers and leadership appointment based on the previous literature. The data 
are discussed in Section III. The methodology and results are described and analyzed in 
Section IV, while conclusions are discussed in Section V. Section VI presents limitations, 
Section VII lists references cited and consulted, and Section VIII contains abstract figures 
and tables. 
II. Literature Review 
 
Merger rationale often involves the ability of companies to realize strategic 
advantages in the form of revenue and/or cost synergies and achieve growth that is either 
too complex or costly to achieve organically. In addition to the common designations of 
acquirer and target, merger participants take one of two forms: strategic partners - two 
similar or complementary companies that combine to achieve operational advantages, 
and financial sponsors - private equity investment firms that use sophisticated capital 
raises known as leveraged buyouts to acquire companies. Financial sponsors are expected 
to create value for their investments through both capital markets and operational 
expertise. Mergers are also characterized in two different forms: horizontal mergers – 
involving companies that combine within similar industries with the intention of 
achieving economies of scale, and vertical mergers – involving companies that combine 
within distinct industries with the intention of obtaining economies of scope. 
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Merger Failure & CEO Importance 
Despite the apparent advantages of mergers, various studies demonstrate that 
mergers are more prone to failure than success. Prevailing literature, until recently, 
pointed to economic rationales as the main driver for merger failure (Allred, 2005). 
Economic rationales include a failure to realize announced or assumed synergies as well 
as incompatible internal processes (i.e. systems, facilities, technologies etc). Synergies 
come in the form of projected cost savings and revenue supplementations. Examples of 
common cost savings include consolidation of similar business segments and accounts as 
well as better terms with suppliers due to economies of scale. Typical revenue additions 
arise from the ability to bundle and cross-sell products to a larger customer base, both in 
geography and demographics. Failure to achieve these economic goals can result from 
both internal factors (i.e. ineffective strategy, products, human capital) and external 
factors (i.e. disrupted industry, macroeconomic shock, extraordinary event). 
Economic grounds are easiest to distinguish, quantify and understand as 
explanations behind merger failures. It is indisputable that an inability to achieve 
projected cost and revenue synergies is a common occurrence in M&As; a McKinsey 
study finds that seventy percent of mergers do not meet revenue synergies while forty 
percent are unable to achieve cost synergies (Frieswick, 2005). However, recent literature 
on merger failure and CEO influence indicate that economic rationales fail to paint the 
whole story, or even most of it (Heijltjes and Allred, 2005). 
Integration, in the physical and social sense, is pointed to as critically important in 
determining the fate of mergers (Heijltjes and Allred, 2005). A merger that is well-
integrated in both senses exhibits the following characteristics: smooth transitions of 
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internal processes, efficient and prudent consolidations of leadership and business 
segments, shared interest in firm objectives, universal understanding and knowledge of 
core competencies, etc. If this occurs the company can more effectively focus on and 
realize business objectives. A merger’s benefits quickly come to light by way of 
additional resources and larger scale. A firm that struggles in demonstrating the 
previously described characteristics of successful merger integration finds itself dealing 
with more conflicts than it can handle, and is often unable to successfully execute 
business strategies.  
During the particularly sensitive time of merger integration and more generally, 
empirical studies have demonstrated that leaders can indeed have an impact on firm 
performance. Successful socio-physical integration, along with the retention of high-
ability leadership, has been shown to play crucial roles in determining the success, or lack 
thereof for M&A transactions (Harding, 2004). Given that management teams have 
departed at rates between 50-75% within five years of the merger the selection of top 
management during the leadership appointment process is quite important (Siehl, 1990 
and Lehn, 2006). 
Leadership Appointment in Typical Mergers 
The ideal situation for any merger is to have the best management team retained, 
carry out a smooth integration, and eventually achieve superior performance. However 
that is very often not the basis for leadership appointment. Ocasio (1999) finds that 
boards of directors rely on pre-established rules and precedents when selecting CEOs, not 
evaluations of merit. These rules include both formal and informal rules. In addition, 
Ocasio’s (1999) results indicate that boards stick to these practices, regardless of whether 
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a CEO’s recent performance has been noticeably strong or weak. So what are these rules 
most boards adhere to?  
Harris (1994) finds that this method of selection includes the precedent that an 
acquired firm’s CEO often loses his title following the transaction. It is also shown that 
the target CEO is often willing to forgo premium to shareholders due to weak bargaining 
power and fear of job loss, reducing shareholder value in the process. This notion is also 
supported by literature regarding conflicts arising from management entrenchment and 
private benefits of control (Wulf, 2003).  
Outside of target management incentives to retain their titles following a merger, 
it has been documented that the premium paid to target, board composition, company 
name, headquarters, and executive compensation are also major tangible factors 
surrounding leadership appointment in typical mergers (Spatt, 2012). Other studies 
involving literature related to human capital theory look at the role of firm and industry 
specific human capital in the leadership appointment process. Bucholtz (2003) observes 
how CEO departure is associated with various human capital characteristics. Results 
indicate that while age and industry relatedness have an effect on CEO departure, there is 
no significant association found between tenure and departure (Bucholtz, 2003). All of 
these studies help illustrate the complex incentive structures and different characteristics 
evaluated during the leadership appointment process in a conventional merger. 
Merger of Equals – Compelling Case Study 
 The already established model of leadership selection as it pertains to traditional 
mergers involves a process in which the acquiring company has significant leverage 
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during negotiations, thus most leadership positions are retained by the purchasing firm. In 
a Merger of Equals leverage from size, earnings contribution, and corporate governance 
structure does not exist. According to Security Data Corporation (SDC), a global M&A 
database, MOEs are classified according to a specific set of characteristics. This includes 
four major attributes: (i) the target and acquirer in a stock swap transaction must have 
approximately the same market capitalization; (ii) there will be equal representation from 
both companies on the board of directors of the new company; (iii) the ownership of the 
new entity will be owned roughly 50/50 by the majority and minority shareholders, and 
(iv) the merger is announced as a merger of equals.  
 In a Merger of Equals, all of the previously described forms of leverage and 
typical methods for selection are controlled for. This is what makes the transaction a 
particularly compelling case study for observing what effect, if any, prior performance 
has on: predicting leadership selection (e.g. whether a good performing CEO is appointed 
during an MOE), and the overall success of the merger (especially the integration phase).  
Effect of Leadership on Performance 
 A question related to the main research questions addressed in this report is 
whether or not leaders can or do tangibly affect firm performance. If a CEO led a 
company that had better returns on assets or the markets favored, did that result from a 
difference in circumstance or personal ability? If more “able” leadership takes the helm 
of a newly formed MOE, can or will they actually create better operating performance or 
returns for shareholders?  
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Current literature is divided on the issue. Studies usually relate to one of two 
forms of thought. One is based in the thinking that environmental forces are too prevalent 
and effectual, making it impossible to distinguish one’s situation from their personal 
decisions (Heijltjes and Rowe, 2005). Proponents of this perspective point to a variety of 
empirical studies that are unable to find significant association between performance 
variability and factors typically attributed to CEO decision-making (Rowe, 2005).   
The other school of thought emphasizes the importance and magnitude of 
strategic choices made by personnel in leadership positions. It is argued that by virtue of 
being in the position to make decisions that significantly alter business operations (i.e. 
product choice, geographic emphasis, marketing methods, personnel adjustments etc.), a 
CEO can and does influence firm performance. Empirical support is mixed, however, 
leading to the need for an additional study on the issue, from a distinct perspective 
(Child, 1972). 
III. Data 
Sample Selection 
 My sample is a collection of Merger of Equal transactions obtained from a J.P. 
Morgan Investment Bank database, which identified and aggregated MOEs from the 
databases of SDC and Dealogic. I begin with all mergers with announcement dates 
between January 1, 1995 and December 31, 2011. The sample comprises acquisitions in 
which the following criteria are met: (i) both firms are publicly traded and listed in SDC 
and Dealogic databases as well on the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) 
database; (ii) the merger is not classified as a share repurchase, a self-tender, or a sale of 
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minority interest; (iii) the type of merger is classified as either a stock swap or a tender 
offer transaction; and (iv) the merger conforms to the SDC’s defining characteristics for a 
Merger of Equals. These criteria yield a sample of nearly 60 observations, which are 
shown in Table 1. Information regarding transaction value, leadership appointment, 
headquarters location, ownership and board composition along with other pre-merger 
negotiations was obtained from public information and the aforementioned databases.  
Observed Time Period 
 My study observes company performance during time periods leading into and 
after merger announcements. As mentioned previously, CEO replacement occurs often. 
In MOEs especially, two-year succession plans for rotating CEO and Chairman positions 
between the two merger CEOs are often negotiated (Spatt, 2012). In order to ensure that 
company performance aligns with the tenure of the examined CEOs, a time period of two 
years is observed in both instances.  
Another important aspect of mergers to account for was the period of time from 
merger announcement to completion. While the newly appointed CEO is typically 
publicized in the announcement press release, he or she does not assume their new role 
until the merger officially concludes. Research finds the average time to completion in 
mergers is nearly seven months (Malmendier, 2012).  In order to account for the 
completion periods with respect to the transactions in my sample, this report measured 
post-merger performance for the two year period beginning eight months after the 
announcement date.  
14 
 
Performance Measurement 
 In this study, I identify and measure a firm’s operational performance as well as 
abnormal stock returns.  Operational performance can be identified through analysis of a 
company’s financial statements, specifically through a metric known as Return on Assets 
(ROA). This generally accepted indicator of business performance measures how much 
income a company can derive for each dollar of assets. Historical income statement (net 
income) and balance sheet (assets) line items for each merger company were retrieved 
from Wharton Research Data Services. I compute ROA by dividing the net income a 
company achieved during a specific time period by the firm’s stated assets.  
Net income before extraordinary items was also used to calculate an ROA metric 
that adjusts for one-time occurrences that materially affect business performance. While 
this metric helps depict normalized earnings, it may allow for a greater degree of earnings 
management on what is “extraordinary” (Shuto). Along with this, the ROA of a company 
was also adjusted for the specific industry in which it operates. This was calculated by 
taking the difference of the firm’s ROA and the average ROA of the company’s Standard 
Industrial Classification (SIC) code peers. That is: 
ܣܾ݊݋ݎ݈ܴܱ݉ܽܣ௧ ൌ  ܨ݅ݎܴܱ݉ܣ௧ െ  ܫ݊݀ݑݏݐݎݕܴܱܣ௧  
where t is the observed time period.  
For companies whose equity is traded on public exchanges, the valuation of their 
shares takes into account the market’s view of the firm’s business prospects. Abnormal 
stock returns (alpha) measure how much value a company has returned to shareholders 
for a specific period of time, controlling for market dynamics. Monthly share price 
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returns for each security as well as the S&P 500 index (market proxy) were collected 
from CRSP. The market model method was used to calculate the abnormal returns for 
each observed time period. This approach is outlined as follows: 
ܴ௜௧ ൌ  ߙ௜ ൅ ߚ௜ܴ௠௧ ൅ ߝ௜௧ 
This method entails having ܴ௜௧ serve as the holding period return of the individual 
security during time period t, where time period t is either the two years leading into 
merger announcement or after merger close. ߙ௜ and ߚ௜ represent the parameters of the 
market model, while ߝ௜௧ symbolizes the error term in the model. The error term is the 
difference between the expected return and the required return of the security as dictated 
by the risks inherent in the market (i.e. the abnormal return). This error term (alpha) 
quantifies the portion of the change in the security’s return not attributable to changes in 
the market. On that basis, this study uses the alpha term as the financial business 
performance metric.  
IV. Models & Results 
Leadership Selection Prediction Model – Probit 
 The first research question this study attempts to address is whether prior 
performance is a predictor for leadership selection in Mergers of Equals. That is, if a 
CEO had performed well as indicated by the business performance metrics described 
previously, are they more likely to be appointed CEO of the newly formed company? 
This was tested using a Probit model of the following form: 
݈ܵ݁݁ܿݐ݁݀ܦܸ ൌ ߙ ൅ ߚଵ כ ܺ ൅ ߚଶ כ ܻ ൅ ߚଷ כ ሺܻܺሻ ൅ ܨ݅ݎ݉ܵ݅ݖ݁ ൅  ߝ 
16 
 
where the dependent variable, ݈ܵ݁݁ܿݐ݁݀ܦܸ, is a binary variable representing whether or 
not a CEO of an MOE participant company is appointed CEO of the newly merged 
company. X includes variables (binary or continuous) related to operating performance, 
Y includes variables (binary or continuous) related to financial performance, XY 
represents any interaction terms between operating and financial performance variables, 
and FirmSize controls for firm size.  
Altogether, five variant models of the Probit form were created. They all offer 
slightly different examinations of the likelihood of CEO appointment given: (i) absolute 
values of ROA and alpha; (ii) whether a CEO performed better relative to his merger 
counterpart in ROA or alpha (binary variable); (iii) the relative performance of a CEO, 
adjusting for income before extraordinary items; (iv) the relative performance of a CEO, 
accounting for the magnitude of performance difference (continuous variable); and (v) 
the relative performance of a CEO, accounting for magnitude and adjusting for income 
before extraordinary items.  
Figure 2 shows the results of these regressions. Although the coefficients - across 
nearly every model - have a positive sign (indicating an increasing likelihood of 
selection), none of them are significant. The marginal effects output of these models can 
be seen in Tables 6-10. The standard errors are within a reasonable realm to indicate that 
better performance metrics are suggestive of an increased likelihood of selection. 
However, given the small sample size and lack of significance at any sensible level, no 
concrete economic significance can be drawn.  
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Another important finding to note, outside of the Probit regression, is the 
distribution of MOE transactions that selected the worse or better performer (i.e. how 
many of the transactions in the sample appointed the “better performer” vs. the “worse 
performer”). For both operations and financial performance, only 54% of the transactions 
appointed the better relative performer.1 When accounting for income before 
extraordinary items in ROA, that percentage drops to 51%. 
These results, for the most part, add further validation to existing literature and 
this study’s hypothesis regarding leadership appointment in MOEs. Given that MOEs 
have no clear target and acquirer, the selection process is much less defined, and these 
results indicate that prior performance does not play a significant role.  
Post Acquisition Performance Model - OLS 
 The second and primary question this report  makes an effort to address is whether 
prior performance should be a primary consideration in the selection process. That is, do 
MOEs that appoint “better performing” CEOs - as indicated by the previously described 
performance metrics - materially outperform MOEs with “worse performing” CEOs? 
This was tested using an Ordinary Least Squares model of the following form: 
ܲ݋ݏݐܯ݁ݎ݃݁ݎܲ݁ݎ݂݋ݎ݉ܽ݊ܿ݁ ൌ  ߙ ൅ ߚଵ כ ܺ ൅ ߚଶ כ ܻ ൅ ߚଷ כ ሺܻܺሻ ൅ ܨ݅ݎ݉ܵ݅ݖ݁ ൅  ߝ 
where the dependent variable, PostMergerPerformance, is either a post-merger operating  
(ROA) or financial (alpha) performance metric. X includes variables (binary or 
continuous) related to operating performance, Y includes variables (binary or continuous) 
                                                            
1 While the proportion of transactions that selected the better performer for ROA and alpha were the same, 
the specific transactions that appointed either a better performing operational or financial CEO differed 
significantly. 
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related to financial performance, XY represents any interaction terms between operating 
and financial performance variables, and FirmSize controls for firm size. Similar to the 
Probit predictive model, multiple variants of this model were run to provide an 
exhaustive perspective on the effect past performance of a CEO had on post-merger 
success.  
The dependent variables for each model, respectively, include: (i) post-merger 
ROA; (ii) post-merger ROA, adjusted for income before extraordinary items; (iii) 
industry adjusted post-merger ROA; (iv) industry adjusted post-merger ROA, adjusting 
for income before extraordinary items; and (v) alpha. These dependent variables are used 
for the binary and continuous independent variable models, resulting in ten different 
variants of the original form.  
The independent variables comprise of: (i-ii) binary variables for whether the 
merger appointed a better performing operating or financial CEO, respectively; (iii) a 
binary interaction term indicating if the merger appointed a CEO that was better 
performing in both metrics; (iv) a continuous variable controlling for firm size; (v-vi) 
continuous variables reflecting the magnitude of difference between the better performing 
operating and financial CEOs, respectively; and (vii) a continuous interaction term 
reflecting the magnitude of difference in performance for CEOs that were better 
performing in both metrics. 
Figure 1 shows the results of these regressions. There are several results worth 
noting. Firstly, none of the binary models have coefficients of significance. This can be 
explained by the nature of the transaction – a Merger of Equals. All of these mergers 
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were horizontal (i.e. within the same industry), and many of the merger companies had 
very similar performance metrics leading into the announcement date. Since these models 
used binary variables, merger transactions that appointed a CEO that materially 
outperformed his counterpart would have as much influence in the regression as one that 
only marginally outperformed.  
The continuous variable models produced several coefficients of significance. The 
coefficient for relative financial performance of a CEO, adjusting for magnitude, had a 
particularly interesting trend throughout models 6-9. It begins in model 6 as significant at 
the 5% significance level, but negatively correlated with post-merger operating 
performance. The value of -.429 implied that an MOE with a better performing financial 
CEO appointed, adjusting for magnitude, performed nearly one half a percentage point 
worse in operations post-merger than an MOE that appointed a worse performer 
financially. That output is not encouraging or supportive of the study’s hypothesis. 
However, once income is adjusted for extraordinary items in calculating post-
merger operating performance, the coefficient loses significance. Furthermore, when 
post-merger performance is additionally adjusted for industry it regains significance at 
the 1% significance level with a positive correlation, and becomes even more positive 
when accounting for extraordinary items. In model 9, the coefficient can be interpreted as 
saying that an MOE with a better performing financial CEO appointed performs over one 
half of a percentage point better operationally post-merger than an MOE that appointed a 
worse performer financially. Within context, that is a pretty compelling relationship. 
Especially in low-margin industries, this implies that appointing CEOs the market had 
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viewed favorably leading into the merger can add over one half a percentage point of 
income for every dollar of assets. That can often be the difference between merger failure 
and success.  
A couple of other significant coefficients, both positive and negative, are worth 
noting. These relationships are noteworthy not because of their importance to answering 
the research question, but rather what they imply about this study’s limitations. In models 
8 and 9, the coefficient in front of the variable for operating performance, adjusting for 
magnitude, is statistically significant at the 5% significance level and negatively 
correlated with post-merger industry adjusted operating performance. The size of the 
coefficient implies that an MOE with a better performing operational CEO appointed 
would perform over one percentage point worse operationally post-merger than an MOE 
that appointed a worse performer operationally. That is a serious relationship that would 
provide strong evidence against this study’s hypothesis.  
However, further investigation shows that this coefficient is largely the result of 
the small sample size. Looking at the distribution of post-merger operating performance 
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(see graph) for MOEs that appointed the better performing operational CEO identifies a 
significant outlier affecting the results – one transaction ended up doing terribly (-20%+ 
ROA post-merger) and negatively skewed the coefficients. Once the outlier is removed, 
those coefficients lose significance and change sign.  
A similar reason explains the coefficient in front of the interaction variable for 
better relative operating and financial performance, adjusting for magnitude, in model 10. 
This coefficient is positively correlated with post-merger financial performance and 
significant at the 1% significance level. The size of this coefficient implies that an MOE 
in which a better performing operating and financial CEO is appointed, adjusting for 
magnitude, will outperform an MOE with a worse performer in both categories by nearly 
18% in stock returns post-merger. However, less than five observations were included in 
this variable, with 3 performing exceptionally well, leading to a positive skew for the 
coefficient. Again, this leads back to the small sample size unduly affecting significance 
in the models. 
The performance model yielded some results of significance in line with this 
study’s hypothesis. This was particularly evident in the correlation between appointing 
better performing financial CEOs and post-merger operational success. Overall, though, 
the small sample size played a large role in skewing many seemingly significant 
economic relationships in the models.  
Box Score Model – OLS 
 My data also included information pertaining to which merger company had their 
Chairman selected and where the newly merged company would have their headquarters 
22 
 
located. The Chairman of the Board can also have significant influence on company 
performance, as he or she determines high-level business strategy and serves to ensure 
the CEO is meeting various performance requirements. Headquarters location is intended 
to serve as a proxy for additional members of the management team; the proxy assumes 
that a larger portion of the management team will be retained at the location where the 
new headquarters is located. 
Building upon the previous model, this study created a Box Score for leadership 
that incorporates this information pertaining to appointed leadership. This Box Score is 
intended to represent how much “leadership DNA” is transferred from the better 
performing company to the newly formed MOE. Three points were assigned if the CEO 
was retained, two for the Chairman, and one point for the headquarters location. This was 
tested using an OLS model of the following form: 
ܲ݋ݏݐܯ݁ݎ݃݁ݎܲ݁ݎ݂݋ݎ݉ܽ݊ܿ݁ ൌ  ߙ ൅ ߚଵ כ ܤ݋ݔܵܿ݋ݎ ஺݁௟௣௛௔ ൅ ߚଶ כ ܤ݋ݔܵܿ݋ݎ݁ோை஺ ൅ ܨ݅ݎ݉ܵ݅ݖ݁ ൅  ߝ 
where the dependent variable, PostMergerPerformance, is either a post-merger operating  
(ROA) or financial (alpha) performance metric. ܤ݋ݔܵܿ݋ݎ ஺݁௟௣௛௔  and ܤ݋ݔܵܿ݋ݎ݁ோை஺  
represent the aggregate Box Score of an MOE transaction according to whether the CEO, 
Chairman, and headquarters location from the better performing financial or operational company 
were retained.  
 Figure 3 displays the results of these different regressions. The coefficients have mixed 
signs, large standard errors, and lack significance. These outputs indicate that these “leadership 
DNA” factors, taken as a whole, have little relationship with post-merger financial or operational 
returns. While it would have added additional support to this study’s hypothesis about past 
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performance if a relationship existed, the outcome is not surprising. This is primarily due to the 
subjectivity of the Box Score ratings. While there may be general agreement as to the rank of 
control over operations a CEO, Chairman, and headquarters location has, it is not possible to 
clearly distinguish the proportion or interrelationships between those variables. The degree to 
which a CEO, either coupled with the same Chairman or not, in the same headquarters or not, can 
influence operations is very situational. Applying a universal rating system to these different 
leadership functions is interesting, but highly subjective and likely inaccurate.  
Going forward, this type of evaluation could be vastly improved with further research on 
the extent to which board members, particularly chairman, influence operating performance. 
Studies that investigate the power dynamic between CEOs and Board Chairmen, as well as the 
incentive structures for being appointed to each position during MOE negotiations, would be 
particularly helpful. Establishing whether or not a relationship exists between headquarters 
location and percentages of the executive team retained would help determine the strength of 
headquarters as a management retention proxy. All of these taken together could severely reduce 
the subjectivity of this analysis and potentially yield significant findings.  
V. Conclusions 
 
Mergers of Equals are transactions that, by definition, do not have a defined target 
and acquiring firm. The absence of these roles largely eliminates the possibility of 
conforming to commonly held practices for leadership appointment in merger 
negotiations. In this paper, I investigate the impact past CEO performance has on this 
process. Firstly, I evaluate whether prior performance of merger CEOs is a significant 
predictor for leadership selection. I find that, although the relationship is suggestive, there 
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is no significant correlation between a track record of performance and being selected as 
CEO in the leadership appointment process.  
This is a direct confirmation of my first hypothesis, and adds an important 
contribution to existing literature regarding MOE leadership appointment. If further 
research were to confirm this hypothesis, it would become general knowledge that CEO 
appointment was not decided on typical evaluations of merit. This could influence merger 
negotiations going forward, as boards (and shareholders) could be forced to more 
empirically justify why a certain CEO candidate was deemed the most appropriate. This 
would especially be the case when one company was objectively performing worse 
heading into the merger.  
Secondly, I assess what measures of prior performance by merger CEOs, if any, 
are significantly correlated with short-term financial and operational success of the 
merged company. Appointed CEOs who exhibit better abnormal stock returns leading 
into the merger add over half a percentage point to ROA in the two years post-merger 
close. This model’s partial confirmation of my second hypothesis has significant 
relevance; half a percentage point of operating performance can often be the difference 
between merger failure and success. Other relationships that appear to be significant are 
clouded by skewness resulting from the small sample size of this study.  
Considered as a whole, these findings do not constitute strong evidence for prior 
performance having an impact on the leadership selection process in MOEs. However, 
taken separately and within the context of this study’s hypotheses, they suggest that prior 
performance should be weighed more heavily than it currently is when selecting 
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leadership. This paper presents literature and its own study demonstrating that historical 
track records do not play a role in whether CEOs are selected during MOE negotiations. 
In addition, the post-merger model yields results both suggestive and significant in favor 
of better performing appointed CEOs being associated with enhanced post-merger 
performance.  
VI. Limitations 
Two limitations moderated the implications of this study’s results – the time 
periods observed and the size of the data sample. Given the high-turnover rate of CEOs, 
it was difficult to observe longer time frames pre and post merger. However, it is also 
difficult for a CEO to fully execute corporate strategy during a 24-month period, 
especially when integration issues dominate the first months of a newly formed merger. 
Also, any new changes a CEO makes that are intended to have longer-term consequences 
may not be fully realized by the market during this period. Thus, it may be more 
appropriate to view this study as an evaluation of how better performing CEOs handle the 
post-merger integration process, rather than success more broadly. Also, as described in 
the results section, the small sample size allowed for outliers to have a disproportionate 
impact on the significance of certain coefficients.  
If MOEs continue on the pace set over the last fifteen years, future research on 
this topic will have the benefit of additional transactions to add to the sample size. It may 
also be helpful to relax some of the defining characteristics of MOEs, as that would add 
considerable size to the data sample. Given a larger data size, future studies would be 
able to analyze transactions in which appointed CEOs stayed on for longer periods of 
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time. This would allow for observation of CEO influence on phases of the merger beyond 
the integration process.  
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for prior ROA and  alpha of a CEO; Binary variables: RPROAdv - relative CEO ROA;  RPAlphadv - relative CEO 
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RPROAdifIBE_RPAlphadif - interaction variable for relative CEO ROA and alpha, accounting for magnitude and  EI
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Figure 3
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(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Constant (0.004) 0.017 (0.022) (0.020)
(0.020) (0.010) (0.019) (0.020)
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Standard errors in parentheses
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Box Score Model Output
Notes: PAROA - post acquisiton Return on Assets; PAAlpha - post 
acquisition alpha; IAROA - Industry Adjusted ROA; IAROA_IBE - Industry 
Adjusted ROA, adjusting for extraordinary items
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New Company Name Majority Shareholder Minority Shareholder Ann. Date CEO Charmn Hqtrs
HollyFrontier Corp. Holly Corp Frontier Oil Corp 02/22/11 Min Maj Maj
BBCN Nara Bancorp Inc Center Financial Corp 12/09/10 Maj Maj Maj
Northeast Utilities Northeast Utilities NSTAR Inc 10/18/10 Min Min Joint
United Continental Holdings United Airlines Continental Airlines 05/03/10 Min Maj Maj
GenOn Energy Mirant Corp RRI Energy Inc 04/11/10 Maj Maj Min
Macrovision Solutions Corp. Macrovision Corp Gemstar-TV Guide Intl Inc 12/07/07 Maj Maj Maj
Transocean Inc TransOcean Inc GlobalSantaFe Corp 07/23/07 Maj Min Joint
NewBridge Bancorp LSB Bancshares FNB Financial Services 02/26/07 Min Maj Min
Exterran Holdings Inc. Hanover Compressor Co Universal Compression Holdings 02/05/07 Maj Maj Joint
AbitibiBowater Bowater Inc Abitibi-Consolidated Inc 01/29/07 Min Min Min
CVS Caremark Corporation CVS Corp Caremark Rx Inc 11/01/06 Maj Min Maj
First Busey First Busey Main Street Trust 09/20/06 Maj Maj Maj
Centrue Financial Corp UnionBancorp Centrue Financial 06/30/06 Min Maj Min
Alcatel-Lucent Alcatel SA Lucent Technologies 03/24/06 Min Maj Maj
Entegris Entegris Mykrolis 03/21/05 Min Maj Min
Sprint Nextel Sprint Nextel 12/15/04 Min Min Min
National Oilwell Varco, Inc. National-Oilwell Inc Varco International 08/12/04 Maj Min Joint
Belden CDT Inc Belden Inc Cable Design Technologies Corp 02/04/04 Maj Min Maj
Regions Financial Corp. Regions Financial Union Planters Corp. 01/23/04 Maj Maj Maj
JPMorgan Chase JPMorgan Chase Bank One 01/14/04 Maj Maj Maj
Enterprise Products Partners Enterprise Products Partners GulfTerra Energy Partners 12/15/03 Maj Maj Joint
SumTotal Systems click2learn.com inc Docent Inc 10/20/03 Maj Min Min
Biogen IDEC IDEC Pharmaceuticals Biogen 06/20/03 Min Maj Min
Sports Authority Inc Gart Sports Co Sports Authority Inc 02/19/03 Min Min Maj
Avanex Avanex Oplink 03/19/02 Maj Joint Maj
Identix Identix Visionics 02/22/02 Maj Maj Min
Proxim Corp Western Multiplex Proxim Inc 01/17/02 Min Maj Min
RCP Cruise Lines P&O Princess Cruises Royal Caribbean Cruises 11/20/01 Maj Min -
ConocoPhillips Phillips Petroleum Conoco 11/18/01 Maj Min Min
GlobeSpan Virata GlobeSpan Virata 10/01/01 Maj Min Maj
Unizan Financial Corp BancFirst Ohio Corp UNB Corp Canton 09/06/01 Min Maj Min
MeadWestvaco Mead Westvaco 08/29/01 Min Maj Min
Business Bancorp Business Bancorp CA MCB Financial Corp CA 08/16/01 Maj Min Min
Pride International, Inc Pride International Marine Drilling 05/23/01 Maj Maj Maj
AmeriSource-Bergen Corp AmeriSource Health Corp Bergen Brunswig Corp 03/16/01 Maj Min Maj
Openwave Phone.com Software.com 08/09/00 Min Maj Maj
National Commerce Bancorp. National Commerce Bancorp CCB Financial 03/20/00 Min Maj Maj
Avocent Corp. Apex Cybex Computer Products 03/08/00 Min Min Maj
NetIQ NetIQ Mission Critical Software 02/25/00 Maj Min Maj
Glaxo SmithKline Glaxo Wellcome SmithKline Beecham 01/17/00 Min Maj Joint
Pharmacia Corp. Monsanto Pharmacia & Upjohn 12/20/99 Min Maj Min
Vodafone AirTouch Plc Vodafone AirTouch 01/15/99 Maj Min Maj
Egghead Onsale Egghead 07/14/99 Maj Min Maj
Vectren Corp. Sigcorp Inc Indiana Energy 06/11/99 Min Min Maj
AstraZeneca Zeneca Astra 12/09/98 Maj Min Maj
Verizon Bell Atlantic GTE 07/28/98 Joint Min Maj
Wells Fargo & Co. Wells Fargo Norwest 06/08/98 Min Min Maj
Sierra Pacific Resources Nevada Power Sierra Pacific Resources 04/30/98 Maj Maj Min
Banc One Corp. Banc One First Chicago 04/13/98 Maj Min Min
Citigroup Inc. Travelers Group Citicorp 04/06/98 Joint Joint Min
TransCanada, Nova TransCanada Nova 01/26/98 Min Min Min
Ocean Energy Inc Ocean Energy United Meridian 12/23/97 Maj Min Min
Promus Hotel Corporation Promus Hotel Doubletree 09/02/97 Maj Maj Maj
R&B Falcon Corp. Falcon Drilling Reading & Bates 07/10/97 Maj Min Joint
Cendant Corp CUC International HFS 05/27/97 Min Maj Joint
Morgan Stanley Dean Witter Dean Witter - Discover Morgan Stanley Group 02/05/97 Maj Maj Joint
Bell Atlantic Bell Atlantic NYNEX 04/22/96 Maj Maj Min
Pharmacia & Upjohn Upjohn Pharmacia 08/21/95 Maj Min Min
First Chicago NBD Corp. NDB Bancorp First Chicago 07/12/95 Min Maj Min
Merger Companies
Transaction List
Table 1
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Table 2
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
PAROA 59 (0.016) 0.058 (0.255) 0.045
IAROA 59 (0.019) 0.054 (0.229) 0.153
PAalpha 59 0.004 0.028 (0.086) 0.083
FPCEOdv 59 0.544 0.503 0.000 1.000
OPCEOdv 59 0.544 0.503 0.000 1.000
FPCEOdif 59 0.002 0.039 (0.131) 0.191
OPCEOdif 59 0.002 0.026 (0.135) 0.077
FPOPCEOdv 59 0.316 0.469 0.000 1.000
FPOPCEOdif 59 (0.000) 0.001 (0.006) 0.002
newcofirms~e 59 11610.560 18329.530 30.360 75952.520
Summary Statistics - Post-Merger Transactions
Table 3
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
majorityfi~e 59 6307.463 10060.210 15.787 44811.990
majorityal~a 59 0.021 0.041 (0.055) 0.239
majorityROA 59 0.002 0.043 (0.206) 0.095
majorityRO~I 59 0.003 0.042 (0.206) 0.095
minorityfi~e 59 5303.095 8340.180 14.573 36279.100
minorityal~a 59 0.021 0.034 (0.038) 0.154
minorityROA 59 0.001 0.028 (0.096) 0.046
minorityRO~I 59 0.002 0.027 (0.096) 0.046
Summary Statistics - Pre-Merger Transactions
Table 4
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
PAROA 59 (0.016) 0.058 (0.255) 0.045
PAAlpha 59 0.004 0.028 (0.086) 0.083
IAROA 59 (0.019) 0.054 (0.229) 0.153
IAROA_IBE 59 (0.017) 0.058 (0.229) 0.193
BoxScore_A~a 59 2.797 1.551 0.000 6.000
BoxScore_ROA 59 3.034 1.629 0.000 6.000
newcofirms~e 59 11610.560 18329.530 30.360 75952.520
Summary Statistics - Box Score Analysis
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Table 5
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
SelectedDV 118 0.479 0.501 0.000 1.000
FirmSize 118 5805.279 9222.164 14.573 44811.990
PPROA 118 0.002 0.036 (0.206) 0.095
PPAlpha 118 0.021 0.038 (0.055) 0.239
RPROAdv 118 0.496 0.502 0.000 1.000
RPAlphadv 118 0.496 0.502 0.000 1.000
RPROAdv_IBE 118 0.496 0.502 0.000 1.000
RPROAdif 118 0.000 0.026 (0.135) 0.135
RPAlphadif 118 (0.000) 0.039 (0.191) 0.191
RPROAdif_IBE 118 0.000 0.026 (0.131) 0.131
Summary Statistics - CEO Selection Predictor (Probit Model)
Table 6
variable dy/dx Std. Err. z P>z [    95% C.I.   ] X
PPROA (0.192) 2.153 (0.090) 0.929 (4.413) 4.028 0.002
PPAlpha 0.794 1.355 0.590 0.558 (1.861) 3.449 0.021
PPROA_~a 17.539 38.848 0.450 0.652 (58.603) 93.680 (0.000)
FirmSize (0.000) 0.000 (0.760) 0.444 (0.000) 0.000 5895.640
Marginal effects after probit 
y = Pr (SelectedDV) (predict, p)
   = .47848317
Marginal Effects - Model 1
Table 7
variable dy/dx Std. Err. z P>z [    95% C.I.   ] X
RPROAdv* 0.105 0.131 0.800 0.421 (0.151) 0.362 0.496
RPAlph~v* 0.104 0.131 0.800 0.426 (0.152) 0.361 0.496
RPROAd..* (0.043) 0.186 (0.230) 0.816 (0.408) 0.321 0.274
FirmSize (0.000) 0.000 (0.300) 0.764 (0.000) 0.000 5409.800
Marginal effects after probit 
y = Pr (SelectedDV) (predict, p)
   = .48680522
Marginal Effects - Model 2
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Table 8
variable dy/dx Std. Err. z P>z [    95% C.I.   ] X
RP~v_IBE* 0.036 0.132 0.280 0.782 (0.221) 0.294 0.496
RPAlph~v* 0.112 0.130 0.860 0.391 (0.144) 0.368 0.496
R~IBE_~v* (0.045) 0.186 (0.240) 0.809 (0.409) 0.319 0.274
FirmSize (0.000) 0.000 (0.340) 0.737 (0.000) 0.000 5409.800
Marginal effects after probit 
y = Pr (SelectedDV) (predict, p)
   = .48696294
Marginal Effects - Model 3
Table 9
variable dy/dx Std. Err. z P>z [    95% C.I.   ] X
RPROAdif 1.498 1.793 0.840 0.404 (2.017) 5.012 0.000
RPAlph~f 0.861 1.214 0.710 0.478 (1.519) 3.241 (0.000)
RPROAd.. 0.519 50.880 0.010 0.992 (99.203) 100.241 (0.000)
FirmSize (0.000) 0.000 (0.490) 0.623 (0.000) 0.000 5520.030
Marginal effects after probit 
y = Pr (SelectedDV) (predict, p)
   = .49108904
Marginal Effects - Model 4
Table 10
variable dy/dx Std. Err. z P>z [    95% C.I.   ] X
RP~f_IBE 0.725 1.798 0.400 0.687 (2.799) 4.248 0.000
RPAlph~f 0.807 1.210 0.670 0.505 (1.564) 3.178 (0.000)
R~IBE_~f (0.193) 49.131 0.000 0.997 (96.488) 96.101 0.000
FirmSize (0.000) 0.000 (0.470) 0.635 (0.000) 0.000 5520.030
Marginal effects after probit 
y = Pr (SelectedDV) (predict, p)
   = .49113248 
Marginal Effects - Model 5
